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Abstract
This paper introduces a bubbly asset into the Matsuyama (2007)
model with credit market imperfections and multiple technolo-
gies and shows that there can exist multiple bubbly steady states
and bubbles may cause underdevelopment traps by preventing the
adoption of high productivity technology.
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11 Introduction
Tirole (1985) shows that, in an overlapping generations model, bubbles
can exist if the bubbleless equilibrium of the economy is dynamically
ineﬃcient and that the existence of bubbles reduces capital accumulation.
Recently, Matsuyama (2007) presents an interesting model with credit
market imperfections and multiple technologies and shows that the model
can generate a rich variety of growth patterns. This paper introduces a
bubbly asset into the Matsuyama (2007) model and examines whether
bubbles can exist and how they would aﬀect the choice of technologies
in the economy.1 It is shown that there can exist multiple bubbly steady
states and that the existence of bubbles may prevent adoption of high
productivity technology.
There are several related studies which also examine the eﬀects of bub-
bles on economic growth and development in the presence of credit market
imperfections. Martin and Ventura (forthcoming) develop a model that
shows a positive relationship between bubbles and long-run growth. Farhi
and Tirole (forthcoming), Hirano and Yanagawa (2010) and Sakuragawa
(2010) construct models in which bubbles can be either a positively or
negatively related to growth. In contrast to these studies, by introduc-
ing multiple technologies this paper studies the eﬀect of bubbles on the
technology choice.
1Gokan (2011) studies the dynamic property of monetary equilibria with a single
technology. Constructing a similar model with heterogenous agents, Kunieda (2008)
examines the dynamic and eﬃciency properties of the bubbly equilibrium.
22 The Model
The basic structure of the model follows Matsuyama (2007). The econ-
omy begins in period 1 and continues toward inﬁnity. A ﬁnal good is






with 0 <  < 1, where Kt and Nt represent capital and labor at period




where yt = Yt=Nt and kt = Kt=Nt. Capital depreciates fully in one period.
A new generation, a unit measure of homogenous agents, is born in
each period and lives two periods. An agent born in period t supplies one
unit of labor when young and consumes only when old. In the young
period, each agent can become either an entrepreneur or a lender. We
denote the ratios of lenders and entrepreneurs in generation t by t and
1 t, respectively. There are ¯ B pieces of a useless asset, which is called a
“bubbly asset.” When the bubbly asset has a positive value, we say that
asset bubbles exist.
If an agent becomes a lender, the agent lends his earnings to en-
trepreneurs in the competitive loan market at rt+1 or holds the bubbly









s.t. lt + bt = wt; (4)
where lt; bt; rt+1 and wt are the quantity of lending, the real value of the
bubbly asset, the real interest rate, and the wage rate, respectively. If the
3bubbly asset is held in equilibrium, the following no-arbitrage condition





If the agent becomes an entrepreneur, the agent can select one from two
types of projects. A type-1 project transforms m1 units of the ﬁnal goods
into R1 units of capital while a type-2 project transforms m2 units of the
ﬁnal goods into R2 units of capital. When mi > wt, the entrepreneur
must borrow mi   wt. The entrepreneur’s consumption when old is
c
e
t+1 = t+1miRi   rt+1(mi   wt);
where t+1 is the rate of return from capital. The ﬁrst term in the RHS
of the above equation is the revenue from investment and the second
represents the repayments to lenders. There are credit constraints in this
economy. Each entrepreneur can pledge only up to a constant fraction of
the project revenue for the repayment, imiRit+1, where 0  i  1 (i =
1;2); and i diﬀers between the two types of projects. The entrepreneur’s
borrowing must satisfy
imiRit+1  rt+1(mi   wt) for i = 1;2: (6)
Because entrepreneurs can choose to become lenders, earnings from in-





t+1 , t+1Ri  rt+1: (7)
Thus, the entrepreneur’s problem is given by
max c
e
t+1 = t+1miRi   rt+1(mi   wt) (8)
s.t. (6) and (7):
43 Market Equilibrium
Under perfect competition, the marginal productivity of each factor is
equal to its price:
t  (kt) = Ak
−1
t ; (9)
wt  w(kt) = (1   )Ak

t : (10)





















This means that the project giving a larger value in the RHS of (11) is
adopted by entrepreneurs. Because both arguments in the brace in the










} for i = 1;2; (12)
we can clarify the equilibrium choice of the project type. Note that, in






=i > 1 , wt < (1   i)mi:





i for i = 1;2; (A1)
R2 > R1 > 1R1 > 2R2 and m2  m1: (A2)
(A1) is equivalent to w(kt) < mi (i = 1;2), which means that agents must
borrow in order to run the project. (A2) states that there are tradeoﬀs
5between the productivity and pledgeability of the projects. Under these
assumptions we can depict the loci of (12) as in Figure 1, where we denote








Figure 1 shows that type-1 project is adopted if 0 < wt < wC while type-2
project is employed if wC  wt < 1. Moreover, since (A2) and (13) mean
(1   1)m1 < wC < (1   2)m2;
it follows that, if wt < (1   1)m1 or wC  wt < (1   2)m2, the credit
constraint is binding while if (1   1)m1  wt < wC or (1   2)m2 
wt < 1, the credit constraint is not binding.
2R2
1R1
wc m1(1   1) m2(1   2) wt
R2
R1
Figure 1: The maximal rate of return under (A2)
Because the wage income of entrepreneurs and the borrowing from
lenders are used for investment, the total amount of investment is
(1   t)wt + t(wt   bt) = wt   tbt:
Since one unit of investment yields R1 units of capital when 0 < wt < wC
and R2 units of capital when wC  wt < 1, the equilibrium capital
6accumulation is determined by
kt+1 =
{
R1(wt   tbt) if 0 < wt < wC;
R2(wt   tbt) if wC  wt < 1:
(14)
Deﬁne
t  tbt=wt: (15)
Then we can rewrite (14) as
kt+1 =
{
R1(1   t)wt if 0 < wt < wC;
R2(1   t)wt if wC  wt < 1;
(16)
which describes the equilibrium dynamics of k in terms of  and w: From
(10) and (16), we obtain the equilibrium dynamics of w:
wt+1 =
{
(1   )A[R1(1   t)wt] if 0 < wt < wC;
(1   )A[R2(1   t)wt] if wC  wt < 1:
(17)
We next consider asset markets. Since the total supply of the bubbly
asset, ¯ B; is ﬁxed and only lenders hold the asset, the equilibrium condition
of the bubbly asset is
¯ B = tptbt: (18)






   
   
1R1(kt+1)
m1−wt if 0 < wt < m1 (1   1);
R1(kt+1) if m1(1   1)  wt < wC;
2R2(kt+1)
m2−wt if wC  wt < m2 (1   2);
R2(kt+1) if m2 (1   2)  wt < 1:
(19)
Combining (18) and (19) yields
rt+1tbt = t+1bt+1; (20)
which describes the dynamic behavior of bubbles.











Finally, using (10), (19) and (21), we obtain the dynamics of :
t+1 =

   




















1−t if m2 (1   2)  wt  1:
(22)
Sequences ft;wtg∞
t=0 satisfying (17) and (22) constitute an equilibrium
of this economy. The equilibrium ratio of lenders, t, can be derived from
the credit market-clearing conditions,
tlt = (1   t)(mi   wt) for i = 1;2: (23)
The LHS of (23) represents the total supply of lending and the RHS is
the total demand for borrowing when type-i (i = 1;2) project is adopted.
Combining (4) and (23), we obtain
t = 1  
(1   t)wt
mi
for i = 1;2:
From (17) the wt+1 = wt locus can be depicted as in Figure 2. At
wt = wC the selected type of projects changes from type-1 to type-2.
Because the productivity of type-2 is higher than that of type-2, the




   




m1−wt if 0  wt < m1 (1   1);
1−2




m2−wt if wC  wt < m2 (1   2);
1−2
1− if m2 (1   2)  wt  1;
(24)
which is depicted in Figure 3. The locus has an upward jump point at



















wC m2(1   2)
Figure 3: The locus of t+1 = t
4 Bubbles and Technology Choice
We ﬁrst derive bubbleless steady states. In this case, t = 0 for all t




 if 0 < wt < wC;
(1   )A(R2wt)
 if wC  wt < 1:
Because this is exactly the same as in Matsuyama (2007), this system
can have multiple steady states or a unique steady state depending on
the parameter values. In the following analysis, however, we restrict our
attention to the case in which type-2 technology is always adopted in the












To obtain steady-state equilibria of the model, let us depict the loci
of wt+1 = wt and t+1 = t simultaneously. Figures 4 show two possible
cases in which multiple bubbly steady states exist. The parameters are
9the same in both cases, m1 = m2 = A = 1,  = 0:45, R1 = 2, R2 = 3:1,
and 2 = 0:3, with the exception of 1: 0.6 in Figure 4(a) and 0.48 in
Figure 4(b). These parameter combinations satisfy (A1) and (A2).
In Figure 4(a), the wt+1 = wt locus always has intersections with the ﬂat
parts of the t+1 = t locus in both the region in which type-1 technology
is adopted and the region in which type-2 technology is employed. In
addition, there is a bubbly steady state in which the type-2 project is
adopted and the credit constraint is binding.
In steady state E1, the adopted technology is of type-1 and the wage
remains at a lower level. Because we assume that type-2 technology is al-
ways adopted in the bubbleless equilibrium, this means that the existence
of bubbles prevents the adoption of type-2, which is more productive than
type-1, and leads to a lower income equilibrium. We call this situation
a bubbly trap. On the other hand, in steady state E2 and E3, type-2
technology is adopted although bubbles exist in the long run. It should
be noted here that in this case the existence of bubbles does not prevent
the adoption of high productivity technology but reduces the steady-state
capital stock as in Tirole (1985).
Figure 4(b) illustrates the same situation except that the credit con-
straint is binding in E′
1.
5 Conclusion
Introducing a bubbly asset into the Matsuyama (2007) model, this
paper analyzed the eﬀect of bubbles on technology choice, which has not


















Figure 4: Bubbly traps
and growth. It was shown that there can exist multiple bubbly steady
states and that the existence of bubbles may prevent the adoption of high
productivity technology and cause a bubbly trap.
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